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Understanding the Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Choice
Tongxuan (Stella) Yang

Abstract
Defined benefit (DB) plans and defined contribution (DC) plans are the two main types of
retirement pensions sponsored by US employers. This paper explores the choices made by
employees in a non-profit firm when offered the option of switching from a DB to a DC plan.
Overall, half of the employees switched into the DC plan and half stayed with the DB. We find
that both demographic and economic factors affected an employee’s plan switch decisions. We
also find that the default option – by making no active election an employee remained in the old
DB plan – had an important impact on some employees’ retirement savings. Surprisingly, half of
the employees under age of 40 who could potentially benefit more from the DC plan defaulted to
the DB plan, and the DB defaulters were more similar to the DC switchers than DB choosers.
According to the employer’s calculation, altogether the defaulted employees with positive
opportunity costs have forgone $7M, or 37 percent of their annual salary. Among those who
switched to the DC plan, the contribution rates were affected by the DC plan match formula, the
employee’s age, salary, and other saving. Given the actual behavior of those who switched, there
was virtually no change in employer pension expenses after the switch.
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Since the 1980s, defined contribution (DC) plans have become critically important
mechanisms for retirement provision.1 There are several explanations for the trend toward DC
plans.2 First, some employers are reluctant to launch new defined benefit (DB) plans because of
relatively high and rising expenses. Second, DC plans have flourished due to their appeal to both
employers and employees. 3 Third, some employers have felt the need to shift risk from the firms
to employees. Although DC plans have many advantages compared to DB plans, this does not
necessarily mean that DC plans are superior for everyone.4 The major advantage of DB plans is
their potential to provide a stable income replacement rate, with capital market and longevity risk
borne by employers. DB plans might be a good choice for stable employees, those who are less
financially sophisticated, and those who are unwilling to take investment risk.
Because theory fails to show either plan type’s superiority, we turn to empirical evidence
to ascertain how employees make one of their most important financial decisions — choosing a
retirement plan — when offered a one-time option to switch from a DB to a DC pension plan.
We are also interested in the “default effect”, i.e., if an employee did not affirmatively elect any
plan by a certain date, he would remain in the old DB plan. In this paper, we explore several
questions using a rich, unique dataset provided by a large non-profit organization. First, which
employees switched from the DB to the DC plan, and how did they compare to those who did
not? Second, were the defaulters different from those who actively selected the DB plan? How
much money was potentially given up as a result of not switching to the DC plan? Why did so
many young employees default to the DB plan when they potentially could obtain higher benefit
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from the DB plan? Third, how did the DC switchers determine their contribution rates to the new
DC plan? Fourth, how did employee choices influence the employer’s pension expenses?
The results show that half of the employees switched into the DC plan and half stayed
with the DB plan. We find that both demographic and economic factors affected an employee’s
plan switch decisions. Female, white, higher-income, non-unionized, and longer-service
employees were more likely to choose the DC plan. Employees also favored the DC plan if they
had past experience with DC-type retirement saving plans and if it was easy for the projected DC
benefit to catch up to the projected DB benefit.
The default option had an important impact on some employees’ plan choice and
retirement savings. Surprisingly, about half of the employees under the age of 40 who could
potentially benefit more from the DC plan defaulted to the DB plan, and the DB defaulters were
more similar to the DC switchers than DB choosers. According to the employer’s calculation,
altogether the defaulted employees with positive opportunity costs have given up $7M, or 40
percent of their annual salary. Among those who switched into the DC plan, older, higherincome, non-African American, and employees with previous DC saving tended to have higher
contribution rates. Given the actual behavior of those who switched, there was virtually no
change in employer pension expenses after the switch.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Not only do we examine
how demographic factors affect employee retirement plan choices, but we also explore the
employee responses to the economic incentives characterized by the internal rate of return and
projected benefit difference between the DC and the DB plans. We find that, in general, an
employee is more likely to switch to the DC plan if it is easier for his DC benefits to catch up to
the old DB benefits. Furthermore, this paper explores a new facet of passive choices in
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retirement savings: how default options influence pension plan choice. We find that many
employees, especially the young, made passive choices and in doing so gave up a large amount
of pension benefits. Last but not least, we investigate the contribution decisions of switched
employees, and the actual influence of employee choices on employer pension expenses, two
topics little examined in previous research.
This research may also shed some light on possible Social Security reform. If part of the
Social Security payroll tax could be deposited into a personal account,5 policymakers should
know who might be more likely to set up such an individual account, how a default option might
influence their decisions, and what determines individuals’ contribution rates. This paper could
help answer these questions.
In what follows, first, we describe previous research on the choice between DB and DC
plans. Next we summarize the plan switch option offered by the large non-profit organization.
Then we construct empirical models to explore how the employees made their decisions and
present the corresponding empirical results. Finally, we conclude and discuss policy
implications.

1. Previous Studies on Employee Plan Choices
Before reviewing the literature, it is helpful to outline the features of DB and DC plans. A
DB plan rewards long service and pays a benefit that depends on final salary. Accordingly, a DB
plan participant faces job change risk and employer default risk. If an employee leaves his
employer prior to retirement, the DB benefit is usually frozen without any future indexation.
Consequently, when the benefit is sought at the time of retirement, it will have been heavily
eroded by inflation. This problem is serious for young employees, both because the backloading
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feature of the DB plan gives them low benefits at leaving, and because of the long time before
retirement. It is also possible that a bankrupted firm may default on its DB pension benefit
promises.6 By contrast, in a DC plan, the employer stipulates contribution amounts rather than
benefit formulas. Consequently, a participant’s risk in this case comes from the investment return
of employee accounts. After the contribution rate has been decided, the DC accumulation
depends heavily on the investment performance of the employee’s total portfolio. Termination
does not threaten DC participants particularly, because DC participants can always rollover their
account into an IRA (or to a new employer’s DC plan); consequently, the money can continue to
accrue investment returns.
DC plans became popular in the United States after the passage of the Revenue Act of
1978; thereafter, increasing numbers of employers redesigned their retirement offerings by
moving to DC plans. Some employers chose to supplement their old DB plans with new DC
plans, usually contributory with an employer match. In other cases, employers let their
employees choose between the old DB plan and a new DC plan. This choice was often given to
the new hires, 7 but some employers, like the one in this paper, allowed current employees to
switch plans.8
Several theoretical studies explore the tradeoffs between DB and DC plans as well as
participants’ optimal selections (See Table 1). Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) employ a
three-period model to explore the influence of wage and interest rate uncertainty on DB and DC
plans. By maximizing the utility of a representative worker subject to the constraint that both DB
and DC plans have equal costs to the firm, they conclude that DB plans are not dominated by DC
plans, since a DB plan offers workers a stable replacement rate of final income and some degree
of insurance against real wage risk. DC plans also possess some advantages over DB plans,
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namely the predictability of the value of pension wealth, the ability to invest in inflation-hedged
portfolios rather than nominal DB annuities, and (possibly) a fully-funded promise. McCarthy
(2003) examines the value of a DB plan using a multi-period analysis, in which he incorporates
wage uncertainty, market volatility, and mortality risk, allowing investment choice to change
dynamically and endogenously. His paper suggests that wage-indexed claims offered by DB
plans are more valuable when the employees are old, when equity markets provide low expected
returns or are highly variable, and when annuity markets are inefficient. Childs et al. (2002)
examine optimal retirement plan choices between DB and DC plans using a real options
framework, taking into account employees’ option to change employers in the future. The
authors model an employee’s current salary as well as a best alternative salary from changing
employers, and they treat these two salaries as following a separate but possibly correlated
diffusion process. The representative employee in this model chooses between a DB or DC plan
using backward induction, by maximizing the sum of the present value of his remaining lifetime
salary plus the present value of expected benefits received from the retirement plan at each node
of a trinomial tree, a decision tree built from the drift and variance of the ratio of the current
salary to the best alternative salary. Numerically simulating three hypothetical workers age 25,
40, and 55, the paper finds that, for reasonable parameter values, DC plans are preferred by
young employees and employees with higher turnover rates, higher risk aversion, and higher
employer contribution rates. Employees with more years of service and higher accrued DB
benefits are more likely to stay in the old DB plan.
Table 1 here
To summarize, existing theoretical studies predict several hypotheses for us to test in our
empirical analysis. First, because the fact that DC plans can better hedge job change risk,
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employees more likely to change jobs prefer DC plans. Second, the backloading feature of DB
plans makes employees with more service and higher accrued benefits prefer DB plans. Third,
young employees prefer DC plans because of their higher job change probabilities and the DC
plan’s capability to help them diversify total portfolio risk when most of their assets are in
human capital.
There are only a few empirical studies on employee plan choices. One, by Papke (2004),
explores the DB and DC plan choices made by corrections workers covered by the Michigan
State Employee Retirement System. The paper finds a relatively low switch rate among
correction workers: only 1.6 percent, lower than the 5.5 percent for all Michigan public
employees. Papke (2004) finds that age and salary were not the determinants of plan switch
decision; however, plan vesting, which enabled a worker to transfer the present value of accrued
DB benefits to the DC plan, had a significantly positive influence on the switch decision. Brown
et al. (2004) seek to answer the question of why only one-third of existing employees in the
Superannuation Scheme for Australian Universities switched to a DC from a DB plan. Based on
152 responses to 620 surveys, they conclude that “risk transfer costs” deterred employees from
switching to the DC plan. The risk transfer costs referred to “any costs associated with risks that
transfer from the employer to the employee when employees shift from a defined benefit to an
accumulation plan [DC plan], and any newly arising risks borne by employees when they
transfer” (P. 6). Limited by their data, neither study explores how the employees responded to
the economic incentives, for example, the projected benefit amounts. Nor do they investigate the
influences of the default effect as well as the switched employees’ saving behavior.
Two other related papers, by Clark, Harper, and Pitts (1997) and Clark, Ghent, and
McDermed (2003), evaluate how newly hired North Carolina State University faculty chose
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between the state public DB plan and several DC plans. Their surveys of the faculty hired
between 1971-1995 and 1983-2001 show that older, female, and black newly hired faculty were
more likely to select the DB plan. The papers also find that mobility expectations, labor market
conditions, faculty rank, and type of appointment all had an impact on plan choice. Their work
differs from our research since we focus on the plan choices of current employees offered a onetime opportunity to switch from a DB to a DC plan, not on the plan choices of new hires.
A handful of other studies describe existing employees’ plan choices, but none of them
links these choices to employee characteristics. A consistent finding is that relatively few people
seem to switch to DC plans: for instance, fewer than 10 percent of Florida state employees chose
the DC plan when given the choice in 2001, while over 80 percent defaulted to the old DB plan
(Feinberg, 2004).9 Similarly, only 10 percent of existing employees at Florida Daytona Beach
Community College facing a DC/DB election selected the DC plan, while 80 percent of new
employees elected the DB option (Trager, Francis, and SigRist, 2001). In a large electronics
company, only one-third of employees chose to switch to a DC plan when the employer offered a
DB/DC choice (Rappaport, 2004). A large health care employer who offered the option to switch
to a new DC plan found that only 20 percent of employees took the option, while the rest either
selected or defaulted to the DB plan (Rappaport 2004). These studies paint a general picture of
how employees behave when offered a switch, but they do not reveal the determinants of plan
choices, nor do they indicate switched employees’ saving rates.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Unlike previous studies, we not
only examine how demographic factors affect employee retirement plan choices, but we also
explore the employee responses to the economic incentives characterized by the internal rate of
return and projected benefit difference between the DC and the DB plans. Furthermore, this
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paper explores a new facet of passive choices in retirement savings: how default options
influence pension plan choice, how much money was given up by the defaulted employees, and
why so many young employees defaulted to the DB plan. Finally, we investigate the contribution
decisions of switched employees, and the actual influence of employee choices on employer
pension expenses, two topics little examined in previous research.

2. The Plan Switch and the Data
Prior to the year 2000, the firm we studied offered a DB pension to its weekly paid, fulltime employees. The annual benefit amount was specified by the following formula:
DB Benefit=1.25% • Final Average Pay • Years of Service,
where the final average pay (FAP) represents the average of an employee’s highest five years of
earnings in the last 10 years of work while in the DB plan. The DB plan was non-contributory,
and vesting occurred after the participant completed at least 1000 hours of service per year for
five years.10 The DB participants were also allowed to contribute to a Supplemental Retirement
Annuity (SRA), a DC-type pre-tax retirement saving account.
In the late 1990s, some employees contended that the DB plan offered a potentially lower
benefit than that provided by a DC plan.11 For example, the DB plan did not have immediate
vesting and portability, nor did it offer employees the chance to make their own investment
decisions. Nevertheless, the DB plan was attractive since it did not require employee
contributions, while the DC plan did require direct employee contributions in order to be eligible
for the employer match. Of course, from an employer’s perspective, a DC plan has its own
appeal. A DC plan is easier to communicate and administer, while its expenses are more
predictable than those of the DB plan. Moreover, offering a DC plan to all might help the
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employer pass the legally required non-discrimination tests, which require qualified retirement
plans not to discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees (i.e., in the year 2000,
anyone earning over $85,000). For all these reasons, the decision to redesign the retirement plans
was seen as accommodating both employee and employer interests.
In March of 2000, the firm offered a one-time opportunity to this group of employees to
switch from the old DB plan to a new DC plan. The DC setup had three layers of contributions.
First, the firm provided everyone who selected the DC plan with a “basic” age-based
contribution, which did not require any employee contribution. This was worth 1 percent of pay
for those younger than age 30, 3 percent of pay for those age 30 to 39, and 4 percent of pay for
those age 40 and over. This contribution would begin after one year of service. Second,
employees were also permitted to make voluntary contributions up to the maximum allowable
contribution amount under federal law and regulations.12 In 2000, the annual employee
contributions to the DC-type plans generally could not exceed the lesser of $10,500 or 20 percent
of salary. All employee contributions were vested immediately. Third, if an employee made a
voluntary contribution to the DC plan, the employer would provide a dollar-for-dollar match up
to 5 percent of salary. Employees could begin to contribute immediately at hire, while the
employer match would begin after a year of service.
The switch option given to the DB participants was one-time and irrevocable, with all
decisions required to be made before June 1, 2000. In March of that year, the Human Resources
Department prepared a Plan Decision Kit for all eligible employees, which included the
following components:
•

Retirement Plan Decision Guide – a description of the important features of both plans
and instructions on how to make an election.
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•

Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits – a personalized benefit sheet
that provided an estimated comparison of a given employee’s projected benefits from the
DB and DC plans. These computations assumed the employee would stay at the firm for
another 10, 15, and 20 years, or until age 65 (See Appendix 1).

•

Mutual Fund Provider’s Enrollment Kits – two kits providing detailed information about
DC plan investment options from two mutual fund companies.

•

Special Retirement Plan Election Form – a form to be filled in and returned by each
employee to show his plan decision.

•

DC Plan Election Form – an additional form only for an employee who decided to switch
to the DC plan.

•

A prepaid envelope.

Besides the Plan Decision Kit, the employer provided additional services to assist employee
decision making. In addition to reviewing the Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement
Benefits based on common assumptions for everybody, employees could access an online
program to evaluate the effect of changing assumptions such as retirement age or investment
returns. The Human Resources Department, with one of the mutual fund providers, also held
several group and individual meetings to explain the DB and DC plan features and answer
employee questions.
Every employee was required to complete the Special Retirement Plan Election Form and
return it to the Human Resources Department no later than June 1, 2000. If the election form was
not received by that date, the employee forfeited his one-time opportunity to join the DC plan
and would remain in the DB plan, or in other words, he would default to the DB plan. In this
event, his benefits would be decided by the DB formula at retirement. Employees who switched
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to the DC plan were asked to specify their contribution rates and asset allocation decisions;
otherwise, the employer’s basic contributions defaulted into the money market fund only, and
additional employee contributions as well as the employer’s match were set at zero. Switched
employees’ accrued, vested DB benefits were frozen as of June 1, 2000.13
The dataset provided by the employer contains information on 3,535 employees eligible
to make the plan switch. The file indicates each employee’s plan decision, i.e., whether he chose
to switch to the DC plan, elected to stay in the DB plan, or defaulted into the DB plan. For those
who switched to the DC plan, we also know their contribution rates. Moreover, the dataset
provides employee characteristics including age, salary, years of service with the employer, sex,
education, ethnicity, bargaining unit, and division information (See Table 2).
Table 2 and Figure 1 here
Table 2 and Figure 1 show that about half of the 3,535 employees elected to switch to the
DC plan, a switch rate higher than in any other study described in the literature to date. Of the
1,784 employees who remained in the DB plan, two-thirds of this group, or one-third of all
employees, defaulted into the DB plan. Only 221 of those eligible (6 percent of all employees)
actively selected the DB plan.14 Employee plan choices across age groups are shown in Figure 2,
where we see that the switch rate is higher for employees in their 30s and 40s, but lower for
employees older than 50. The most surprising result comes from the group in their 20s, whose
switch rate was only 40 percent, far below the employer’s expectation of 80 percent. For the
employees who switched into the DC plan, the average pre-tax contribution rate of all
participants was 6 percent of salary.
A representative employee was 41 years old, with an annual salary of $28,000 and 9
years of service with the employer. There were fewer males (40 percent) than females. Only
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about one-quarter had college degrees; some 44 percent had no college degree, and for the
remaining 31 percent, education information was lacking. Regarding ethnicity, 46 percent of the
employees were White, 35 percent were African-American, and 5 percent were NativeAmerican, Asian-American and Hispanic; for 14 percent ethnicity information was lacking.15
About a quarter of the employees were union members, and they belonged to 10 different
bargaining units. On average, these employees had accrued a DB lifetime annuity worth about
$3,060 per year, which could be collected only at retirement. Athough each employee had the
option of saving pre-tax salary through the Supplementary Retirement Annuity, only 18 percent
actually had put any money into the SRA account; the average contribution rate was 6 percent
among employees with positive contribution rates.
To examine the switch decision, we use projected benefit values calculated by the
employer and provided to the participants in the Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement
Benefits in the Plan Decision Kit. The average DC and DB benefit difference was $3,290 in
annuity terms, assuming that the employee retired at the age of 65.16 In an unreported table, we
find that younger employees would benefit more from the DC plan, since both their contribution
and investment periods were much longer than for older employees. Consequently, with the
above assumptions, their DC plan benefits had the potential to exceed the DB plan benefits. As
age increased, the benefit difference decreased, both because the DC plan contribution and
investment period was shorter, and because the back-loading feature of the DB plan made the
DB benefit rise quickly. On average, if an employee was older than 45, his projected DB benefits
would be higher than his projected DC benefits.
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3. Empirical Models and Results
In what follows, we focus on how the employees chose between the DB and the DC plans
at this non-profit firm. Specifically, we ask which employees switched from the DB to the DC
plan, how they compared to those who did not, and whether employees who defaulted to the DB
plan differed from those who actively chose the DB plan. Further, we ask what the opportunity
costs were for the DB defaulters, especially those young defaulters, and what the potential
reasons were for them to fall in to the default. Next, for those employees who switched to DC
plan, we examine how they determined their contribution rates. Finally, we explore the pension
expense changes for the employer as the result of switch behavior of the employees.

3.1 Employee Plan Choice Behavior
To explore who switched to the DC plan, we compare them to the employees staying in
the DB plan. We test the hypotheses noted above regarding the relationship between plan type
and employee age, service, and DB accumulations. In addition to these factors, we hypothesize
that other economic factors, including projected benefit differences between the DC and DB
plans, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), 17 salary and other saving, and demographic factors
(including gender, education, and bargaining unit) influence plan selection outcomes. The
projected benefits of the DB plan and projected benefits of the DC plan for each employee were
adapted from the Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits.
In particular, we hypothesize that an employee is more likely to switch to the DC plan if
his projected DC plan benefit is higher than his projected DB plan benefit. Therefore, the
projected benefit difference, (DC-DB), is predicted to have a positive influence on employees’
switch decisions. We hypothesize that employees with a higher salary should also be more likely
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to switch to the DC plan, both because their liquidity constraints may not be very tight, and
because a higher income might enable an individual to bear more risk by providing a cushion for
bad DC portfolio returns.18 It is well recognized that women are more likely to have an
interrupted employment and salary history than men because of family burdens. Conditional on
pay, therefore, we hypothesize that women would prefer the DC over the DB plan, because the
former would be seen as more portable and hence provide higher benefits to job changers.
Education may proxy for financial literacy, since more years of education may expose people to
more financial knowledge and help them understand investment risk. If so, we predict that more
educated employees would be more likely to switch to the DC plan. In this firm, the DB-covered
workers had an option to save pre-tax money in an SRA, a retirement saving vehicle with DC
characteristics. It is possible that those who were investing in the SRA prior to 2000 would also
better understand the DC choice, compared to those without SRA saving, and their familiarity
with DC plans might make them more likely to switch to the DC plan. On the other hand, such
employees might also want to diversify by holding both a DB and DC plan, so it is an empirical
question as to how existing SRA saving influenced plan selection outcomes. Finally, we include
bargaining unit to proxy for peer effects, whereby pension decisions might be influenced by
colleagues with more contacts (Duflo and Saez, 2002).
Our first empirical model of the switch decision is therefore described as follows, with
Prob (DC) set equal to 1 if the employee selected the DC plan and 0 otherwise:
Prob ( DCi ) = f ( EconomicFactorsi , DemographicFactorsi ) + e1 .
Here, the vector Economic Factors includes the projected benefit difference (DC-DB), salary,
the existence of SRA saving, and the amount of accrued DB benefits. The vector Demographic

16

Factors includes the worker’s age, sex, service, education, risk aversion, ethnicity, and
bargaining unit.
Table 3 shows the empirical results. Column 1 reports salary and service years, while
Column 2 contains only the accrued DB benefit and vested indicator to explore these variables’
pure effects. The accrued DB benefit is a function of salary and service, equaling 1.25 percent
times of the product of salary and service. We focus first on the economic factors. Salary is
positively correlated with the switch to the DC plan; switched employees earned on average
$29,000 annually versus $27,000 for the stayers. The positive link between salary and switch
may come from the liquidity constraint and investment risk tolerance discussed above.
Employees with an SRA account are more likely to switch to the DC plan. This may be because
familiarity with a DC model enhanced its appeal, or it could be the result of the bull market over
the 1990s, making employees feel more optimistic about DC plan savings. Consistent with our
hypothesis, age is negatively and significantly linked to the switch decision, meaning that
younger employees are more likely to switch to the DC plan. Service is negatively correlated
with the switch decision, meaning that employees with fewer years of service are more likely to
switch to the DC plan. This is because more years of service could entitle an employee to higher
backloaded DB benefits, creating an incentive for the employee to stay with the DB plan
(consistent with Childs et al., 2002). The negative relationship could also be due to employee
self selection, i.e., employees with longer service could be most satisfied with their jobs and thus
unlikely to leave the employer before retirement. Women and Whites are less likely to stay with
the DB plan, and education has no separate effect. Interestingly, there is evidence that unionized
employees are more likely to stay with the DB plan, which may stem from the peer effect
reported in Duflo and Saez (2002). Column 2 shows the influence of accrued DB benefits and
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vesting. Consistent with Childs et al.(2002), employees with lower accrued DB benefits are
more likely to switch to the DC plan. Vested employees are more likely to switch to the DC plan
than the non-vested employees.19
Table 3 here
The projected benefit difference between the DC and DB plans at the age of 65, (DCDB)65,20 also affects plan election, as shown in Column 3 of Table 3. These projected benefit
computations developed by the employee use a consistent set of assumptions for all workers,
including 7 percent investment return, 3 percent wage increase, and age 65 retirement for each
employee. Surprisingly, we find that the projected benefit difference has a negative influence on
employee switch decisions, meaning that an employee is less likely to switch to the DC plan if he
expected more benefits from the DC plan. This counter-intuitive finding suggests that some
employees might not have made their plan switch decision based on the projected benefit
differences supplied by the employer. We believe this counter-intuitive result might arise for
several reasons. First, the benefit differences were computed by the employer at a specific future
point (e.g., at retirement age 65). Nevertheless, workers might have non-zero turnover possibility
every year; in fact, the firm’s 1999 DB plan actuarial report assumed a 7.2 percent termination
rate for employees in their 30s, 5.2 percent for those in their 40s, 2.6 percent for 50s, and 0.1
percent for 60s and above. Second, the projected benefits calculations assumed everyone vested
in the DB plan, yet young employees with a higher probability of job termination might not vest.
Consequently, the projected DB benefits would have been overestimated for some. Third, the
plan sponsor assumed DC investment return of 7 percent, which might have differed from
investment returns assumed by the employees in arriving at their plan switch decisions.21
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To partially mitigate these problems, we next turn to an Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
calculation to investigate how the IRR might have affected employee plan selection. Previous
behavioral research suggests that people tend to regard what they think they already have as a
reference point, given an alternative choice.22 Accordingly, an individual might not accept an
alternative option unless it provided a benefit no less generous than the status quo. In our case,
the DB benefit might have served as the benchmark for the DC plan, so an employee might have
switched to the DC plan only if he believed that he had a low projected DB benefit benchmark.
To allow for such a reference effect, we calculate an IRR for each employee, defined as the
investment return that would equate projected DB and DC benefits. We then use this as a
regressor in the above empirical model, replacing the benefit difference, to see how this IRR
threshold influenced employee plan choices. Moreover, in calculating each IRR, we take into
account each employee’s vesting status as well as the probability that the employee might change
jobs in the future. The fact that the DC plan is portable means that a terminated employee’s
benefit could be rolled over and reinvested, potentially protecting it from inflation; as a result,
the projected DC benefit provided by the sponsor would be underestimated. Accordingly, when
calculating IRRs, we incorporate the turnover rate reported in the employer’s defined benefit
plan annual actuarial report in 1999.
To solve for the IRR, we first note that the expected present value of the DB benefit
expressed as a present value at the worker’s current age is given by:

E [PV ( DB)] =

1
(1 + r ) 65−a

65

∑θ

t = a +1

t

⋅ Bt ,
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where


1  t −1
 ∑ Salary a (1 + w) j −a  ⋅ ServiceYearst ⋅ AF65
⋅
1
.
25
%


Bt = 
5  j =t −5


0

if t − a + s0 ≥ 5
if t − a + s0 < 5

and a is the age in 2000; t is the age at point of evaluation; θ t represents the employee’s
expected turnover rate at age t conditional on working at age a; Bt is the annuity benefit that one
has accrued if he leaves the firm at age t; s0 is the employee’s years of service as of 2000; w is
the expected wage growth rate of 3 percent; and ServiceYearst is the employee’s tenure as of age
t. The Annuity Factor at age 65, AF65 , is calculated from the probability of being alive at age t,
which is mt , and the discount rate r (at 7 percent), assuming everyone dies by age 110 as in the
mortality table:
110

mt
.
t −65
t =65 (1 + r )

AF65 = ∑

The expected present value of the DC plan benefit flowing from the employer’s
contribution can be calculated as:23
E [PV ( DC )] =

1
(1 + r ) 65−a

 t −1

65

∑ θ ⋅ ∑ ( BC

t = a +1

t

 j =a

+

j


+ MC j ) ⋅ Salary a ⋅ (1 + w) j −a ⋅ (1 + IRR)T − j 


1
DB _ Accrued a ⋅ AF65 ,
(1 + r ) 65−a

where BC is the basic DC contribution by the employer, tied to the employee’s age; MC is the
employer’s dollar-for-dollar match up to 5 percent of the employee’s contribution; and
DB _ Accrued a is the employee’s accrued DB plan benefit given his current age. Note that in the
DC plan policy there is no employer match if the employee’s service is shorter than a year, so
BCj=MCj=0 if j − a + s0 < 1 .

20

The IRR can be calculated by equating projected DB and DC benefits:
E[PV ( DB)] = E [PV ( DC )] .

We predict that the lower the IRR, the more likely the employee will choose to switch to the DC
plan.
On average, the IRR was around 9 percent for all employees, and the average IRR of
switchers was much lower than that of stayers: 7 percent and 14 percent respectively. These
numbers support our hypothesis that employees with lower IRRs were more likely to switch to
the DC plan, since it would have been easier for them to meet and exceed the DB benchmark.
This hypothesis is further supported by multivariate analysis controlling on economic and
demographic factors. For example, Column 4 of Table 3 shows that the IRR is significantly
negatively associated with an employee’s switch decision. In other words, employees with lower
IRR are more likely to switch to the DC plan.
In summary, we find that both the economic and the demographic factors influenced the
switch decision. Employees with higher salary, less accrued benefits, and other DC plan saving
are more likely to switch to the DC plan. Employees also select the DC plan if it is easy for them
to catch up to the DB plan benefit, proxied by the internal rate of return. Yet using the
employer’s projected benefit difference between DC and DB plan, (DC-DB)65, produces counterintuitive results, probably because this variable does not reflect several important factors that
could have influenced plan switch decisions. We also find that young, female, short-tenured,
White, and non-unionized employees are more likely to switch to the DC plan.
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3.2 The Default Effect

We next explore whether employees actively electing the DB plan differed from those defaulting
to the DB plan, what are the opportunity costs of defaulting, and why many young employees
defaulted to the DB plan rather than switching to the DC plan.

3.2.1 The Differences between DB Defaulters and DB Choosers

When the company offered the new plan, it specified that any employee who did not
inform the Human Resources Department of his plan choice prior to June 1, 2000 forfeited his
one-time opportunity to join the DC plan and defaulted to the DB plan until terminating
employment. Thus any employee who wanted to stay with the DB plan could end up in that
position via two different routes: either by filling out the Special Retirement Plan Election Form
and mailing it back to the Human Resources Department, or by doing nothing and defaulting into
the DB plan.
We next evaluate whether the defaulters were different from those who made active
decisions. The null hypothesis is:
H0: Employees who defaulted into the DB plan are similar to those who actively chose
the DB plan.
The following empirical model is employed to explore the differences between active DB
electors and DB defaulters:
Pr ob( Default i ) = f (EconomicFactorsi , DemographicFactorsi ) + e2 ,
where Default equals 1 if the employee defaulted to the DB plan and 0 if he actively elected the
DB plan. The model is estimated using probit analysis. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the
coefficients/partial effects should not be significant individually and jointly; however, if the two
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groups differ from each other, we will find the coefficients/partial effects jointly and individually
significant. The EconomicFactors and DemographicFactors are the same as those we used
above in the switch decision analysis.
Table 4 reports the comparisons between employees who actively elected the DB plan
versus those who defaulted to the DB plan. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that many
variables are statistically significantly different from 0. For instance, younger, shorter-tenured,
and male employees are more likely to default into the DB plan; compared to Whites, all other
ethnic groups are more likely to default. Employees with SRA saving and higher accrued DB
benefits are less likely to default to the DB plan, which seems to suggest that defaulting
employees are less interested in retirement savings on the whole. Although there is a negative
relationship between income and DB defaulting, the result is not statistically significant after
controlling on other variables. The Wald Chi squares of both probit analyses are much higher
than the critical value at the 1 percent level, meaning that the explanatory variables are jointly
significant at the 1 percent level. In summary, the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that at
least some of the employees defaulting to the DB plan differ from those actively electing the DB
plan.
Table 4 here
Column 3 shows how the projected benefit difference at age 65, (DC-DB)65, is associated
with default behavior controlling on other economic and demographic variables. The result
shows that the DB defaulters tended to have a higher projected benefit difference than did the
DB choosers, indicating that the defaulters potentially could obtain higher benefits had they
switched to the DC plan. One might argue that these projected benefits may not capture the
actual influence of plan differences, since the calculation ignores vesting, turnover rates, and
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investment risk as mentioned above. In Column 4, we therefore take into account these factors
using the IRR, and we find that the DB defaulters on average would benefit more from the DC
plan: the IRRs of defaulters are lower than those of DB choosers, suggesting that it is easier for
the defaulters’ DC benefits to catch up to the DB plan benchmarks than it is for the DB
choosers’. Hence, the results on both (DC-DB)65 and IRR show that compared with the DB
choosers, the DB defaulters would do better in a DC plan. Consistent with Column 1 and
Column 2, we find males, non-Whites, and employees with other DC saving are more likely to
default to the DB plan.

3.2.2 The Similarities Between DB Choosers and DC Switchers

We have found that the DB defaulters were not very similar to the DB choosers, which
suggests that at least some employees defaulted to the DB plan for reasons different from those
driving the DB choosers. In fact, if we go back to examine the variable descriptions in Table 2, it
is surprising to find that the DB defaulters appear more similar to DC switchers than DB
choosers. The average age of DB defaulters is 38, closer to that of DC switchers at 40 than to
that of DB choosers at 53; further, the average salary of DB defaulters is $26,100, closer to that
of DC switchers at $28,700 than to that of DB choosers at $31,200; the same pattern is also
found for service years. Since age, salary, and service are the major determinants of projected
DB and DC plan benefits, it appears that the DB defaulters are more similar to the DC switchers.
On average, the projected benefit difference of DB defaulters is positive at $5,820 (even higher
than that of DC switchers at $2,680), indicating that on average the DB defaulters would do
better if they had switched to the DC plan. By contrast, the average projected benefit difference
of DB choosers is negative at -$1,480, meaning that on average the DB choosers would benefit
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more from remaining in the DB plan. The internal rate of return of the DB defaulters, at 10
percent, is closer to that of DC switchers at 7 percent, rather than that of DB choosers at 21
percent. Figure 3 shows the distribution of IRR for different groups of employees. Plan choices
of both DB choosers and DC switchers are sensitive to the economic incentives in the direction
consistent with our intuition; at each selected percentile point, the DB choosers have much
higher IRRs than the DC switchers. When focusing on the DB defaulters, we see that their IRRs
are obviously close to, yet a little bit lower than, those of DC switchers at most of the selected
percentile points (except at the 90th percentile point).
Figure 3 here
To test whether the DB defaulters are similar to the DC choosers, we next examine the
predicted switch probabilities of each group. We first run a probit model on all active electors
with the dependent variable set to 1 if the employee was a DC switcher and 0 if he was a DB
chooser. Explanatory variables are the same as those in Column 1 of Tables 3 and 4. Then, using
the coefficients from the probit model, we predict the switch probabilities of all employees,
including the active electors and the DB defaulters. As shown in Figure 4, the average predicted
switch probability of DB defaulters, at 0.9, is closer to that of DC switchers at 0.92, and far from
that of DB choosers at 0.69. The same pattern can be found on the medians of the predicted
switch probabilities. Hence, this analysis implies that if all the defaulters had been forced to
make an active plan selection, many of them would have chosen the DC plan.
Figure 4 here
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3.2.3 The Opportunity Cost of DB Defaulters

Since the DB defaulters and DB choosers prove to be different from each other, at least
some of those who could have benefited more from the DC plan gave up something for not
picking the right plan. Accordingly, we next ask how large the opportunity cost is, i.e., how
much money the defaulters gave up, by subtracting the present value of projected DB benefits
from that of projected DC benefits. The equation we have in mind is:
OpportunityCost i = PV ( projected _ DCBenefitsi ) − PV ( projected _ DBBenefitsi ).
Using the employer’s calculation of projected benefits, Panel A of Table 5 shows that the
present value of the opportunity cost is estimated to be $2,700 in lump sum per capita across all
defaulting employees. Summing over all defaulters, the cost totals about $3 million, or 9 percent
of total salary. According to the formula above, the opportunity cost is positive if an employee’s
projected DC benefits are larger than his projected DB benefits, and negative otherwise. We next
focus on the subset of DB defaulters who are employees with positive opportunity cost, i.e.,
those whose DC benefits are projected to be greater than their projected DB benefits. On
average, we estimate that a typical member of this subset gave up a lump sum equivalent to
$9,300. All together, the DB defaulters with positive opportunity costs left unclaimed $7 million,
or 37 percent of their annual salary, as a result of not switching to the DC plan. Generally,
younger employees gave up more than the older employees, partly because younger employees
had the potential to benefit more from the DC plan because of their longer contribution and
investment horizons. Table 5 shows that older employees were hurt less by defaulting to the DB
plan. Panel B of Table 5 shows how the calculations vary if we take into account both the vesting
rule and turnover rates. We find that the number of employees defaulting and the size of the
opportunity cost are quite close to those in Panel A.
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Table 5 here
3.2.4 Potential Explanations for the Defaulting Effects Young Employees

Another look at Figure 2 shows a U-shaped default rate across different age groups, i.e.,
the default rate was higher for both very young employees in their 20s and for old employees in
their 60s, with low default rates for those in the middle.24 The average opportunity cost of
defaulters younger than 40 years old is a positive $9,300 (in lump sum, in 2000 dollar), while
that of defaulters older than 40 years old was actually negative at -$9,480.25 It is not surprising to
have older employees defaulting to the DB plan, because they were presumably aware that
making no active election would default them into the DB plan, which potentially offered greater
retirement benefits. More puzzling is why so many young employees (younger than 40 years old)
also defaulted to the DB plan. Next, we evaluate several potential explanations for young
employees’ high default rates.
A first explanation might be that some young employees face liquidity constraints,
making the contributory DC plan less appealing. In fact, the average annual salary of the young
defaulters was $25,000, lower than that of the DC switchers ($27,000) and DB choosers
($29,000). If, at the extreme, the young defaulters would contribute nothing to the DC plan, and
hence would be eligible for zero employee match, Panel C of Table 5 shows that the opportunity
costs of all defaulters would be negative, indicating that the projected expected DB plan benefit
would exceed the DC plan benefit. Although the liquidity constraints could help explain the
default behavior of some employees, it is unlikely to explain the behavior of all young
employees. Previous studies on DC plan saving found that saving rates increase with employee
age, salary, and services.26 As an employee ages, liquidity constraints relax, enabling him to save
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more for retirement. If the same employee faces high job change risk, then defaulting to the DB
plan would have him forgo the upside potential of the DC plan.
Second, if the young defaulters are highly risk averse, the DB plan would be more
attractive than the DC plan. For instance, defaulters might have regarded the DB plan as risk-free
In this case, they would have also invested their DC accounts in risk-free assets had they
switched. So the DC portfolio return would be too low for the DC benefits to catch up to the DB
benchmark. Panel D of Table 5 shows that if the DC portfolio had been invested entirely in riskfree assets, earning a 4 percent annual return, the opportunity cost for the DB defaulters would be
negative (with a 4 percent discount rate). Of course, the risk aversion argument might explain
some defaulters’ choices, but it is unlikely that it was binding to all of them. One reason is that
the “risk-free” feature of the DB plan is a misperception. Although this DB plan is “free” of
default risk (the probability of this firm going bankrupt is very small), the employer may still
shut down the DB plan or change the benefit formula in the future. Further, there is no evidence
that the young DB defaulters were more risk-averse than the young DC switchers or DB
choosers. In fact, when we impute their risk aversion coefficients using the empirical technique
developed by Halek (2002), the DB defaulters were less risk averse than the DC switchers.
Third, the high default rate by young employees could be a result of their not paying
attention. Previous studies have found that many young employees are not very interested in
retirement saving, but the older they become, the more they are involved. Accordingly, one
explanation for the default behavior of some young employees could be that they did not pay
attention to the choice, or the opportunity cost was not high enough to arouse their interest.
Lacking individual interviews or surveys, we cannot judge the importance of inattention.
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Fourth, procrastination could also be a potential explanation for young employees’ high
default rate. Several analysts have found that automatic enrollment has a powerful effect on
401(k) saving behavior. In particular, Madrain and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004) report that
younger employees, women, and employees with shorter tenure and lower income are more
likely to procrastinate, by retaining both the default contribution rate and the default allocation. If
young employees tend to procrastinate more than older ones, having the DB be the default may
explain why so many DB defaulters were young.

3.3 Saving by Switched Employees

Employees who switched to the DC plan faced two key decisions: how much to
contribute to the plan, and how to allocate funds across the available investment options. Both
decisions can have a profound impact on accumulated plan balances at the time of retirement,
and hence they can greatly influence retiree income. Therefore we next describe how we analyze
the links between DC plan contributions and employee characteristics.
Prior studies have concluded that employees’ DC plan contribution rates tend to increase
with age, for any given salary group.27 Two explanations have been provided for this
phenomenon. First, some employees seek to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Younger
employees save less because of school expenses, house loans, and the expenses of raising a
family. In contrast, older employees tend to have lower financial burdens. Second, many
individuals find it difficult to make long-term plans. Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor (2000) support
this theory, reporting that shorter planning horizons reduced participant contribution rates.
Several empirical studies also find a positive link between age and DC plan contribution rates
(Clark and Schieber, 1998; Papke, 2003; Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang 2004). Consequently, we
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predict that age is positively associated with contribution rates. Salary is also an important
determinant of retirement savings; some low earners might face liquidity constraints, making
saving less likely (Goodfellow and Schieber, 1997; Clark and Schieber, 1998; Huberman,
Iyengar, and Jiang 2003). Therefore we hypothesize a positive link between salary levels and
contribution rates. More years of service and higher education can help employees realize the
importance of retirement saving; therefore, these two also would be expected to correlate
positively with DC contribution rates. It is not a clear priori how SRA savings should affect DC
contribution rates. On one hand, an employee with SRA saving might simply have a higher
marginal saving rate, and therefore he would be more likely to have greater DC contributions.
On the other hand, SRA saving might reduce interest in the DC plan if the employee regarded his
retirement saving as sufficient. Which factor dominates is an empirical question to be explored
below. We also hypothesize that there may be peer effects, so that one’s bargaining unit could
influence employee DC saving decisions.
Because of the regulation of the IRS tax code and the employer’s restriction, employee
combined total annual contributions under the DC plan and the SRA generally cannot exceed the
lesser of $10,500 or 20 percent of salary. Hence, employees are capped regarding their
contribution capability. In our dataset, few employees were capped by $10,500, so we mainly
focus on the 20 percent cap. Conditional on participation, the empirical model linking these
variables is as following:
θ + θ ⋅ DemographicFactorsi + θ1 ⋅ EconomicFactorsi + e4
if DCR * > 20%
ContributionRatei =  0 1
20%
if DCR * > 20%
where DCR * is the desired contribution rate. Both OLS and tobit regression are employed to

estimate the results.
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Switched employees’ pre-tax contribution rates to the DC plan and SRA averaged 6
percent of their base salary. If we also take into account the employer basic and matching
contributions, the total contribution rate averaged 12.6 percent. Figure 5 shows the distribution of
employee pre-tax contribution rates. Only around 3 percent of switchers contributed nothing to
the DC account, making them eligible for only the employer’s basic contribution; 28 percent of
the switchers obtained some employer match contribution but did not exhaust the 5 percent
employer match cap. The contribution rates of a large number of the switched employees – 42
percent – clustered at 5 percent, the employer match cap. This last result is consistent with
Kusko, and Wilcox (1998), and Choi et al. (2002), showing the importance of the employer’s
match cap. The remaining 27 percent of employees saved more than 5 percent of salary.
Figure 5 here

Table 6 shows how employee characteristics are associated with employee pre-tax
saving, exclusive of the employer’s basic and match contributions. Consistent with Clark and
Schieber (1998) and Papke (2003), we find that age is positively correlated with employee
contribution rates; older employees apparently care more about retirement savings and tend to
contribute more than younger employees. The link between salary and contribution rate is
positively significant, suggesting that high-income employees save more than low-income
employees, consistent with previous studies (Goodfellow and Schieber, 1997; Clark and
Schieber, 1998; Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang 2003). In our empirical results, service, sex, and
education level do not affect employee DC plan savings. We do find ethnicity matters: African
Americans tend to save less than Whites, while other ethnicities saved more (including AsianAmericans and Native Americans and Hispanics). We also find that employees with an SRA
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account and more accrued DB benefits before the switch tended to save more, meaning that
employees with higher saving propensity in one setting also save more in other settings.
Table 6 here

3.4 Employer Contribution Expenses

After analyzing employee plan choices as well as the saving rates of the switchers, one
might wonder how employee behavior influenced the employer’s total expenses.28 We focus here
only on the impact of switched employees, since there is no predicted change in benefit expenses
as a result of those who remained in the DB plan. To see whether the employer ended up paying
more or less, we compare the present value of anticipated DB expenses had no switch occurred
with those given the switch. As a benchmark case, we first estimate a conservative expense
measure, assuming that all switched employees remained with the employer until retirement. In
that case, the expense due to a switcher equals the expense of what the employer would have
paid if the worker had remained in the DB plan: this is the present value of his DB benefit:
Expense DB =

1
(1 + r ) 65− ai

1
∑1.25% ⋅ 5  ∑ Salary (1 + w)
T −1

i

 j =T − 5

iai

j − ai


 ⋅ ServiceYears iT ⋅ AF65



where i represents the ith participant; ai is the worker’s current age; r is the discount rate set at 7
percent; T is the retirement age set at 65; w is the expected wage growth rate of 3 percent; and
ServiceYeariT is the employee i’s tenure as of age T. The Annuity Factor at age 65, AF65 , is

calculated as above.
The DC expense of a switched employee is represented by the present value of the DC
plan basic and match contributions, plus his accrued DB benefits:
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 T −1 ( BC ij + MCij ) ⋅ Salary iai ⋅ (1 + w) j − ai

1
.
ExpenseDC = ∑  ∑
DB
_
Accrued
AF
+
⋅
⋅
a
65
i


(1 + r ) j − ai
(1 + r ) 65− ai
i  j = ai


where BCij and MCij are the basic contribution and match contribution for participant i at his age
j, and DB _ Accrued ai is the participant i’s accrued DB benefit at his current age ai.
By comparing ExpenseDB with ExpenseDC, we can ascertain the employer’s expenses
from the DB and DC plans. Since not all employees would have actually remained at the firm
until retirement, we also provide expense saving estimates that take into account non-zero
turnover rates.
To explore the most expensive case, we first assume every employee would have stayed
until retirement. Here, projected expenses are discounted to (2000 dollar) using a discount rate of
7 percent, consistent with the plan sponsor’s assumptions. The results first illustrate projected
changes in employer expenses assuming that (a) all switched employees contributed at least 5
percent of pay, to get the full employer match, and (b) turnover rates were zero. As shown in
Table 7, assuming no turnover, the average projected DB plan expense per employee was
$49,160, and the per employee projected DC plan expense was quite close, $48,750. Given
actual DC switch patterns and contribution rates, however, however, the average expense of each
employee was lower, at $46, 210, because one-fifth of the employees contributed less than 5
percent. When these employer expenses are summed up to calculate total expenses, we find that
the total DB expense for the 1,610 employees who switched would have been a projected $79
million dollars (171 percent of annual salary), in contrast to the projected $78.5 million (169
percent of annual salary) assuming all employees took a full match, or $74.4 million (161
percent of annual salary) based on actual employee contributions and no turnover. Therefore, the
employer’s benefit expenses would have been projected to fall if half of its eligible workforce
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switched to the DC plan and no one left before retirement. Allowing for turnover, the changes in
benefit expenses were lower, since the employer has no obligation to make contributions for
terminated employees. In this second case, the present value of the DB expense would have been
$52.3 million (113 percent of annual salary), very close to actual DC contributions of $52.8
million (114 percent of annual salary), but lower than the case of a 5 percent match for
everybody of $55.2 million (119 percent of annual salary). In other words, given the actual
behavior of employees who switched, there was virtually no change in employer total pension
expenses after the switch.
Table 7 here

Conclusions

This paper employs a unique dataset to explore employee decisions to switch from a DB
to a DC plan, the effect of default options, and the saving behavior of employees who switched
into the DC plan. Our research helps understand how employees made one of their most
important financial decisions, choosing a proper retirement plan, and how the different features
of the DB and DC plans influenced employee choices. The analysis shows that younger, female,
and higher-income workers as well as those with less service were more likely to choose a DC
plan. Previous benefits also influenced plan choices: employees with lower accrued DB benefits
or some previous DC savings were more likely to choose the DC plan. After incorporating
positive turnover rates into an internal rate of return calculation, we find that employees with
lower internal returns were more likely to choose the DC plan. This means that an employee
chose a DC plan when he expected that it would be easy for him to meet or exceed the DB plan
projected benefit.
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We also find that the default option can have an important impact on retirement choices.
Surprisingly, about half of young employees who could potentially benefit more from the DC
plan defaulted to the DB plan, and the DB defaulters were more similar to the DC switchers than
the DB choosers. According to the employer’s calculation, altogether the defaulted employees
with positive opportunity costs gave up $7M, or 37 percent of their annual salary.
For those who switched into the DC plan, the 5 percent plan match cap strongly affected
DC plan saving rates: more than 40 percent of them saved at exactly 5 percent, and only 30
percent contributed more than 5 percent of salary. Older employees and employees with higher
incomes tended to have higher contribution rates. The DC participants with an SRA account
before the switch tended to save more, meaning that employees with a higher saving propensity
in one form consistently save more for retirement in another form. We also find saving
differences among different ethnicities: African-Americans saved less than Whites, but other
ethnicities (Asian-Americans, Native-Americans, and Hispanics) saved more than Whites.
Several policy implications flow from this paper. If a Social Security reform allowed
workers to redirect some of their payroll tax to an individual account, our findings suggest that
the employee’s characteristics, including age, salary, service, sex, and ethnicity, will have an
impact on his probability of setting up an account. Moreover, having had past experience with a
DC plan also influences the probability of adopting such an account. Policymakers should also
contemplate what the default options, if any, should be to realize particular policy objectives. If
the policy objective were to encourage young workers to set up individual accounts, the default
should be the new individual account instead of the old DB plan. Another implication pertains to
employee education. We believe that the high switch rate of 50 percent at this employer was
partly due to market timing, but it was also the result of extensive employer communication
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about plan features and projected benefits. Consequently, employee education appears to be very
important in retirement saving
In future work, we hope to evaluate how the switched employees allocated their
retirement assets, and whether saving rates and asset allocation changed over time. Another
interesting question is whether actual DC plan payouts proved to be higher or lower than the
projected DB benefits forecasted at the switch date. We will also calculate projected DC benefits
based on actual rather than hypothetical contribution rates and asset allocations, to evaluate
whether switchers’ DC benefits based on actual portfolios will exceed projected DB benefits at
the time of the policy change.
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Table 1. Comparison of DB and DC Plan Characteristics.
DC Plan
Usually participants make
their investment decisions.1

Dominant Plan
DC

Participants have to bear all
investment risk.
Participants are entitled to all
investment returns.

DB

Participants could rollover and
keep investing investment
savings.
Participants have less
incentive over their entire life
than in the DB plan since their
DC benefits depend upon the
wage trajectory over their
entire life
Benefits tied to career average
earnings.

DC

Most DC plans’ distribution is
lump sum. Participants might
face unfavorable mortality rate
when purchasing annuity in
market due to adverse
selection problem.
Source: Author’s summary extending Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988).

DB

Investment Choices
Investment Risk
Investment Returns

Termination and
Portability
Incentives

Wage-Path Risk
Life Annuity

DB Plan
Participants have no control
over the investment of pension
money.
Participants do not need to
bear investment risk.
Participants can only collect
the benefits defined in the DB
formula even if the investment
has favorable returns.
Participants leaving their job
forfeit future indexation of
benefits already accrued.
Participants have greater
incentive to sustain a high
level of effort over the entire
career in order to achieve a
high career-end salary.
Benefits tied to wage used in
the formula, mostly the final
wage.
Usually offers life annuity
with favorable mortality rates

Not clear2

DB

Not clear3

Notes:
1. Papke (2003) mentioned that 82 percent of 34 million participants in 401(k) plans had some control
over their investments in 1997.
2. Since DC participants bear investment risk, participants have the potential to have DC benefits exceed
DB if they make correct choices. But it is also possible that DC benefits could be lower than DB
benefit if the participants make wrong investment decisions.
3. On one hand, DB benefits tied to final wage could provide employees with a type of incomemaintained insurance not available to those in the DC plan. On the other hand, if wage paths are
unpredictable, it might be very risky to tie one’s pension benefits to the final wage.
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Table 2. Sample Economic and Demographic Characteristics
Variable
(DC-DB)65

IRR with
Turnover
SRA99
Risk Averse
Accrued DB
Age
Salary
Service
Male
Degree
eth_AfricanAm
eth_Other
Union
Vested
Observations

Unit
Benefit difference between
DC and DB plan if
employee stays with
employer until 65
Internal Rate of Return with
turnover rate
Other DC savings (pre
2000)
Risk aversion
Accrued DB benefit as of
2000
Age
Salary
Year of service
Male
At least college degree
African American
Other ethnicity (Hispanic,
Asian-American, and Native
American)
Unionized
Vested

$K

Sample
Average
3.29

DB
Choosers
-1.48

DC
Switchers
2.68

DB
Defaulters
5.82

%

0.09

0.21

0.07

0.10

0/1

0.18

0.29

0.25

0.08

Num
$K

1.43
3.06

1.32
6.05

1.53
2.92

1.44
2.21

Num
$K
Num
0/1
0/1
0/1
0/1

41
27.7
9
0.41
0.25
0.35
0.05

53
31.3
16
0.36
0.20
0.33
0.01

40
28.7
8
0.36
0.28
0.32
0.06

38
26.1
7
0.45
0.26
0.38
0.05

0/1
0/1

0.28
0.57
3474

0.38
0.88
220

0.23
0.57
1701

0.29
0.43
1169
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Table 3. Determinants of Employee Choice between DB and DC Plans
(Dependent Variable: 1=DC, 0=DB)
(1)

(2)

Economic Factors
(DC-DB)65

(3)
-0.006**
[0.001]

IRR
Salary

-1.191**
[0.273]
0.009**
[0.002]

Accrued DB
SRA99
Demographic Factors
Age
Service
Male
Degree
eth_AfricanAm
eth_other
Union

0.211**
[0.022]
-0.005**
[0.001]
-0.006**
[0.002]
-0.103**
[0.024]
-0.016
[0.025]
-0.083**
[0.022]
-0.047
[0.043]
-0.104**
[0.023]

Vested
Observations
R-squared

(4)

3090
0.09

-0.016**
[0.005]
0.210**
[0.022]

0.178**
[0.023]

0.235**
[0.023]

-0.072**
[0.024]
0.034
[0.025]
-0.118**
[0.021]
-0.037
[0.043]
-0.150**
[0.023]

-0.087**
[0.025]
-0.018
[0.025]
-0.121**
[0.022]
-0.068
[0.044]
-0.124**
[0.024]

3061
0.08

3037
0.11

-0.004**
[0.001]

-0.071**
[0.024]
0.003
[0.025]
-0.118**
[0.022]
-0.063
[0.043]
-0.134**
[0.024]
0.127**
[0.027]
3039
0.09

Note: 1.Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percen
2. Missing value dummies included, but not reported here.
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Table 4. Differences between DB Defaulters and DB Choosers
(Dependent Variable: 1=DB Defaulter, 0=DB Chooser)
(1)
(2)

Economic Factors
(DC-DB)65

(3)
0.014**
[0.001]

IRR
Salary

-0.075*
[0.035]
-0.002
[0.001]

Accrued DB
SRA99
Demographic Factors
Age
Service
Male
Degree
eth_AfricanAm
eth_other
Union

-0.088**
[0.031]
-0.006**
[0.001]
-0.005**
[0.001]
0.047*
[0.020]
0.007
[0.021]
0.057**
[0.017]
0.080**
[0.016]
0.002
[0.018]

Vested
Observations
R-squared

(4)

1389
0.27

-0.012**
[0.003]
-0.067*
[0.029]

-0.115**
[0.032]

-0.171**
[0.037]

0.051**
[0.019]
-0.007
[0.021]
0.065**
[0.016]
0.080**
[0.016]
0.002
[0.017]

0.081**
[0.023]
0.044*
[0.021]
0.072**
[0.018]
0.109**
[0.015]
-0.032
[0.022]

1376
0.23

1345
0.14

-0.006**
[0.001]

0.050*
[0.019]
-0.012
[0.021]
0.055**
[0.016]
0.077**
[0.014]
-0.001
[0.018]
-0.03
[0.023]
1345
0.29

Note: 1.Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent
2. Missing value dummies included, but not reported here.
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Table 5. Opportunity Cost of DB Defaulters (Discounted to 2000 dollar)
OpportunityCost i = PV ( projected _ DCBenefitsi ) − PV ( projected _ DBBenefitsi )
# of Obs.

Average (K$)

Total (M$)

% of Annual Salary

1142

2.7

3.1

9%

Defaulters with Positive
Opportunity Costs

730

9.3

6.8

37%

Age 20-30

412

11.4

4.7

48%

Age 31-40

273

7.3

2

28%

Age 41-50
Age 51+

45
0

2.6
0

0.1
0

9%

1142

3.3

3.8

13%

Defaulters with Positive
Opportunity Costs

791

8.4

6.6

34%

Age 20-30

412

9.7

4

41%

Age 31-40
Age 41-50
Age 51+

300
79
0

8
3.2
0

2.4
0.3
0

31%
13%

1

Panel A: Base Case
All Defaulters

Panel B: Including Expected Turnover
All Defaulters

Panel C: Including Expected Turnover, and 0 Employer Match (Liquidity Constraints)
All Defaulters
-104%
1142
-27.21
-31.07
Defaulters with Positive
Opportunity Costs
0
0
0
Panel D: Including Expected Turnover, and 4% Investment Return and Discount Rate
(Highly Risk Averse)
All Defaulters
Defaulters with Positive
Opportunity Costs

1142

-21.18

-8.9

0

0

0

-81.3%

Note: 1. Base case assumptions: match contribution=5%, investment return=7%, discount rate=7%,
wage growth=3%, and no turnover
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Table 6. Effects of DC Switcher Characteristics on DC Plan Contributions

Economic Factors
Salary
SRA99
Demographic Factors
Age
Male
Degree
Service
eth_AfricanAm

eth_Other
Union
Observations
R-squared

OLS

Tobit

0.036*
[0.015]
0.031**
[0.002]

0.036*
[0.016]
0.031**
[0.002]

0.071**
[0.012]
0.003
[0.002]
0.245
[0.239]
-0.021
[0.018]
-0.008**
[0.002]
0.012*
[0.005]
-0.004
[0.004]

0.073**
[0.011]
0.003
[0.002]
0.256
[0.232]
-0.021
[0.016]
-0.008**
[0.002]
0.012**
[0.004]
-0.004
[0.004]

1606
0.22

1606
0.043

Note: 1.Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent
2. Missing value dummies included, but not reported here.
3. Pseudo R-squared from Tobit analysis.
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Table 7. Present Value of Employer Pension Expenses (In 2000 dollar)
Per Employee
($)
49,160

No Turnover
Total
($M)
79.14

DB expense
DC expense with
5% match
48,750
78.49
DC expense with
actual match
46,210
74.4
Source: Author’s calculation
Note: discount rate=7%, and wage growth=3%.

% of EE
Salary
171%

With Turnover
Per Employee
Total
% of EE
($)
($M)
Salary
32,510
52.35
113%

169%

34,280

55.19

119%

161%

32,790

52.8

114%
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Figure 1: Employee Plan Choices
60%
50%
50%

40%
33%
30%

20%
11%
10%

6%

0%
DC Selected

Defaulted into DB

DB Selected

DB Unknown

Source: Author’s tabulation.

Figure 2. Employee Plan Choices by Age
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Source: Author’s tabulation.
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Figure 3: Internal Rate of Return vs. Plan Choice
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Source: Author’s calculation.

Switch Probability

Figure 4: Predicted Switch Probabilities
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Figure 5: Distribution of DC Contribution Rates among Employees Who Switched
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Appendix 1: The Sample Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits

Firm Name
Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits
Retirement DB vs. DC Plan
Assumptions:
Age in Calendar Year 2000:
Age Benefits Begin:
Current Annual Salary:
Years of Prior DB Service:
Investment Rate of Return:
Future Salary Increase Rate:
Employee Contribution Rate:
Estimated Annual DB Benefit
Payable at Age 65 (See Notes 1 and 2): $

Prepared for:
Name
Address

31
65
$24,000
1
7.00%
3.00%
5.00%
267

Projected benefits shown below are based on various assumptions. Actual benefits may be higher or lower.

Option

Plan

Remain in DB

DB Benefit (Notes 1 & 2)

Join DC Plan

Total DC + DB Benefit
Estimated DB Benefit (Notes 1&2)
Basic DC Benefit (Note 3)
Matching DC Plan (Note 4)

Annual Retirement Benefit at Age 65
Annual Retirement Benefit at Age 65
if You Terminate Employment
Assuming Continued
at the End of an Additional:
Employment to Retirement
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
10 Years
15 Years
20 Years
(Amounts shown below are Employer contributions only)
$4,062

$6,850

$10,422

$26,273

$14,628
$267
$5,478
$8,883

$20,608
$267
$8,136
$12,205

$25,551
$267
$10,333
$14,951

$35,289
$267
$14,661
$20,361

Calculation Notes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Note: The projected benefits shown above are based on various assumptions. Actual benefits may be higher or lower.
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Endnotes
1

In the United States, the number of employer-sponsored DC plans increased from 331,000 in

1979 to 674,000 in 1998, while the number of defined benefit plans decreased from 140,000 to
56,000. Meanwhile, DC plans have enlarged their coverage from 18 million employees in 1979
to 57 million in 1998, while defined benefit DB coverage increased only slightly, from 37
million to 42 million (USDOL 2001-2002).
2

See Mitchell (2000) and Fore (2001) for details.

3

DC plans are attractive to employees because of individual involvement, more investment

choice, immediate vesting, and portability at job change; employers also like DC plans because
they are easy to communicate to employees and there is no underfunding risk.
4

For instance, Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988), and McCarthy (2003) find that there are

trade-offs between DB and DC plans, and so there is no clear dominance.
5

For example, the three models suggested by the President’s Commission on Social Security

Reform allow employees to redirect part of their Social Security payroll tax to an individual
account. See Cogan and Mitchell (2003) for details.
6

In our case, since the probability of the employer going bankrupt is very small, the default risk

should not be a big problem for DB participants. Also, the influence of default risk is mitigated
to some extent by the benefit insurance provided by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC).
7

This is more likely to happen in the public sector, as in North Carolina State University (Clark,

Harper, and Pitts, 1997), State Teacher’s Retirement System of Ohio
(http://www.strsoh.org/newmembers/3.htm), Florida (http://www.frs.state.fl.us/) after June 1,
2002, and Colorado after January 1, 2006 (http://www.copera.org).
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8

This happened in both the private and public sectors; c.f. the large electronics employer and a

large health care employer mentioned by Rappaport (2004), Colorado State Employee’s
Retirement System (Fore 2001), Florida’s Daytona Beach Community College (Trager, Francis,
and SigRist, 2001), and the Michigan State Employee Retirement System (Papke, 2004).
9

In a more sophisticated analysis, Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) examined a different

aspect of the Florida state plan. Not only were employees offered a chance to switch from a DB
to a DC plan, but they were also granted one subsequent chance to switch back to the old plan.
That study presents a simulation of the value of the option to buy back the DB benefit, but it did
not link actual behavior to observed employee characteristics.
10

Full-time monthly paid employees were participating in a DC plan, in which they had to

contribute a specified amount of money, choose their own investment, bear the investment risk,
and receive the accumulated balance.
11

Employee reactions were reported in the firm’s internal newsletters.

12

Up to 5 percent of employee contribution went to the match plan, and entitled them to the

dollar-to-dollar employer match up to 5 percent as described below. An employee’s contribution
above 5 percent would go to the Simplified Retirement Account, a supplementary DC-type
retirement saving account offered to all employees.
13

All newly hired employees meeting participation requirements after the 2000 switch date are

eligible only for the DC plan.
14

An additional 384 employees were in the DB plan after the switch, but the dataset did not

indicate whether they selected the plan or defaulted to it. In the multinomial logit regression
below in Table 3 and Table 4, those 384 employees are omitted.
15

Missing values are flagged with a dummy variable and included in all regressions.
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16

All the benefit amounts provided by the employer to the employee in the Personalized

Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits reflected only employer contributions, without taking
into account employee contributions. The employer’s computations assumed the following: an
investment return of 7 percent; future annual salary increases of 3 percent; retirement at age 65;
and employee DC contribution rates of 5 percent. The benefit differences were calculated by
subtracting the DB annuity amount from the DC annuity amount, which was converted from the
lump sum under the Single Life Annuity Option. To guarantee comparability between DB and
DC benefits, DC benefits were assumed to be paid under the Single Life Annuity Option, which
pays a benefit during the lifetime of the participant only; mortality assumptions were based on
the Annuity 2000 Table (Merged Gender) with age setback 2 years. The annuity conversion
interest rate was assumed at 7 percent. The difference between the projected DC and DB benefits
at age 65 was equal to [Converted DC annuity65+Accured DBannuity now -DB Annuity65].
17

The definition and influence of Internal Rate of Return will be introduced later in this section.

18

The DB plan is a non-contributory plan, and vested employees were eligible to plan benefits

without contributing into the plan. In the DC plan, all employees could receive the employer’s
basic contribution without contributing anything, but to receive employer’s dollar-for-dollar
match contribution, positive employee contributions were required. Hence, lower-income
employees facing possible liquidity constraints might not have extra money to make positive
employee contributions, therefore forfeiting their rights to receive the employer match, which
would in turn entitle them to fewer benefits in the DC plan than they would have received by
remaining in the DB plan. Furthermore, the major risk in the DC plan is investment risk: if an
employee invests in equities instead of in low-risk instruments such as money market funds or
long-term bond funds, he may lose some of the value of his portfolio. A higher income might
enable an individual to bear more risk by providing a cushion for bad returns, so we predict that,
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all else constant, the higher the employee’s salary, the more likely that he would have switched
to the DC plan.
19

The vesting policy in our case differs from that of the Michigan State public pension plan

participants (Papke, 2004). In our case, all the accrued DB benefits of vested employees are
frozen if they switch to the DC plan. Non-vested employees with at least 5 years’ combined
service in the DB and the DC plans will vest in the frozen DB benefits accrued as of June 30,
2000. But if a non-vested employee leaves the employer before completing 5 years, he will
forfeit his DB benefits. However, in Michigan’s case, all the vested accrued DB benefits could
be transferred to the DC plan to be indexed to future investment returns. Hence, we would
predict a smaller influence of vesting in our case than in Michigan’s case.
20

The unreported analysis shows that the projected benefit differences calculated by assuming

the employee stays with the employer for an additional 10, 15, and 20 years generates similar
influences as does (DC-DB)65.
21

Another important reason for the negative link between (DC-DB) and switch decision is, as we

will show in the next section, that a large number of young employees, who potentially could
benefit more from the DC plan than from the DB plan (i.e., higher value of (DC-DB) 65), actually
defaulted to the DB plan by making no active elections.
22

See Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) for details.

23

In calculating the expected DC benefits, to compare with the non-contributory DB plan

benefits, we only take into account the employer’s basic and match contribution (at 5 percent of
match cap), without any employee’s contribution. However, one might say that this is still not
fair, since the employer’s match is conditional on the employee’s positive contribution. Actually,
an employee’s voluntary contribution at 5 percent to get 5 percent match could be treated as
redirecting the employee’s other saving outside of the DB plan before switch (5 percent of pay)
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to the DC plan. For many employees without liquidity restrictions, contributing 5 percent of pay
is rational for several reasons. First, the employer match in this case, dollar-for-dollar up to 5
percent, is relatively generous (the typical match formula in the United States is fifty-cents-perdollar up to 6 percent). For many employees, especially the young, the total amount of employee
compensation, salary plus benefits, may be higher when an employee receives an employer
match by contributing to the DC plan. Also, employees can get a tax benefit from retirement
saving, since DC plan contributions and investment returns are tax deferred. In fact, we will see
in section 3.3 that 70 percent of employees contributed no less than 5 percent, which exhausted
the entire employer match.
24

The age distribution of DB defaulters is significantly different from that of the DB choosers.

Among the defaulters, 62 percent were younger than 40 years old, while only 12 percent of DB
choosers were younger than 40 years old.
25

The older employees could obtain more benefits from the DB plan partially because the

backloading feature of the DB plan favors the long-tenured employees who would stay with the
employer until retirement, and partially because the DC plan investment period is shorter for the
old employees to accumulate a high account balance.
26

See Clark and Schieber (1998), Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang (2003, 2004), Engelhardt and

Kumar (2004).
27

See Holden and VanDerhei (2001) for details.

28

We have no information on plan administrative cost, so our impact analysis concentrates on

contribution expenses.

